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TERRORISM:  A REVIEW  OF LAW AND  RECENT
PRACTICE
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INTRODUCTION
Public  statements  condemning  terrorist  acts  are  the  common  cur-
rency  of international  relations  among  major  industrialized  democra-
cies.  Only  in  exceptional  cases,  however,  do  these  expressions  of out-
rage translate into actual  cooperation  that leads  to the punishment  of
terrorists. Divergences  in foreign  policy  produced  by geopolitical,  eco-
nomic,  and historical considerations  often  frustrate common action.
This  article examines four examples  of multinational efforts  to bring
terrorists to trial and traces the elements leading to success or failure in
each.  They  are:  (1)  the  Achille  Lauro hijacking,  (2)  the  arrest  of
Fawaz Younis,  (3) the hijacking  of TWA ffight  847, and  (4)  the trial
of  Georges  Ibrahim  Abdallah.  Although  these  cases  have  important
differences, certain themes are common. First, and most important, the
doctrine of state sovereignty  continues to be a major barrier to the de-
tection and prosecution of terrorists. Application  of public international
law  compartmentalizes  sovereign  power  into  discrete  territories,  thus
allowing perpetrators  of political  violence to move from jurisdiction  to
jurisdiction, leaving  law enforcement  officers far  behind as they seek to
negotiate away the effects  of borders.  Second, each state's commitment
to fighting  terrorism  rests  on  a  unique, often  fragile  political  compro-
mise.  The  introduction  of  external  interests  in  the  form  of  another
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state's  request  for  assistance  could  upset  a  delicate  political  balance.
Finally,  the distinct  internal  political  groups  that produce  a  domestic
compromise  do  not  merge  into  a  monolithic  bloc  at  the  first  hint  of
foreign involvement.  Rather, institutional constituencies  such as law en-
forcement  officials  may find  that their interests  resemble  those  of their
foreign  counterparts  more than those of other groups  within their  own
country.  This  dynamic  provides  a  powerful  analytical  tool for  explain-
ing  the success  or failure  of international  cooperative  efforts.
I.  THE NEED  FOR INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION:  THE
HIJACKING  OF THE ACHILLE  LAURO
On  October  7, 1985,  a  group  of  armed  men  seized  control  of the
Italian  cruise  liner,  the Achille  Lauro,  as  it  left  Alexandria,  Egypt,
and  headed  for Port Said.2 Demanding  Israel's release of fifty Palestin-
ian  prisoners,  the  hijackers  threatened  to  execute  hostages,  starting
with the American  passengers.'  They claimed  affiliation with the Pales-
tine Liberation  Front (PLF), but initially it was difficult to know which
of the  three conflicting  factions  of the  PLF they  represented.  Two  of
the three factions were hostile to Yasser Arafat, chairman  of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization  (PLO).  The third faction, under  the lead-
ership  of Abu  Abbas,  was  loyal  and  subordinate  to  Arafat  and  the
PLO.4
The  United  States  promptly  dispatched  its  special  rescue  team  of
highly  trained military  personnel  and took what  steps  it could  to keep
the ship in international  waters.5 There  a rescue  effort  would  not  vio-
late the sovereignty  of any  country, including Italy, since Italy had  lost
control of the ship. Keeping the ship in international  waters  would also
prevent  the terrorists  from  dispersing  the  hostages.  The  National  Se-
curity  Council  team  managing  the  crisis  for  the  United  States  pre-
ferred launching  a military rescue to attempting negotiation  for a vari-
1.  See generally Jenkins,  The Achille Lauro Hijacking (1989)  [hereinafter Achille
Lauro Hijacking] (discussing  the effect of the hijacking  on  Italian-American  relations
and international  crisis  management)  (available from the Case Program, John  F. Ken-
nedy  School  of Government,  Harvard  University,  Kennedy  School Case Nos. C16-88-
863.0 and  C16-88-864.0).
2.  Tagliabue,  Ship  Carrying 400  Is Seized;  Hijackers Demand Release of 50
Palestinians,  N.Y. Times, Oct.  8,  1985,  at Al.
3.  Achille Lauro Hijacking, supra note  1, at  1(A).
4.  See generally McGinley,  The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications  for Interna-
tional Law,  52  TENN.  L.  REV.  691,  699  (1985)  (describing  the split  of the  PLO  into
pro-Arafat  and  anti-Arafat  sections).
5.  Achille Lauro Hijacking, supra note  1, at 2-3(A).
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ety  of  reasons  based  in  terrorism  policy,  national  morale,  and
institutional  strengths.6
Italy  also alerted  its military  rescue  forces,  but  preferred  to  seek a
diplomatic  solution.7  The United  States had  made counter-terrorism  a
matter  of doctrine  and  dogma.  Italy  not only  had  a more  pragmatic
approach,  being willing  to deal  with  terrorists  if that might  save lives
on this  occasion,  but,  as a  Mediterranean  power,  it also  claimed  very
special relations  with  the Arab states.
The decision whether  to undertake  a military rescue effort depended
upon developing the intelligence needed  to determine whether the PLF-
connected hijackers were associated  with Arafat's PLO or opposed to it
and the PLO's  steps  toward  negotiations  with  Israel.  Arafat's  faction
would  not have intentionally  hijacked the ship of a friendly power such
as Italy from the port of a friendly power such as Egypt at a time when
it also  wanted  the  United  States  to  support  its  peace  efforts."  State
Department officials  speculated that the hijackers  were planning a raid
in Israel  but someone on the ship had detected  their presence,  causing
them to  panic and hijack  the Achille Lauro. 9
U.S.  officials  had  to  determine  which  PLF  faction  had  seized  the
ship before they could decide  on a solution. They theorized  that if the
hijackers  were  associated  with  Arafat,  the western  powers  would  not
need to launch a dangerous  military assault for two reasons.  First, such
an  attack  would  be  unnecessary  to  free  the  ship  and  its  passengers,
since Arafat would  probably  find  a way  to  release the ship. Second,  a
military  attack  on the hijackers  would  not be  necessary  to discourage
future hijackings,  because  even  in this case there was  no initial inten-
tion  to hijack  the ship.
If, on the other  hand,  an anti-Arafat  faction  of the PLF had seized
the ship, the hijackers'  intent may have been to discredit Arafat in his
diplomacy efforts. Under this scenario,  negotiations would be less likely
to  resolve  the hijacking.  Furthermore,  it would  be more  important  to
take actions that would discourage future  hijackings. But if these anti-
6.  See Gwertzman,  State Department Angry  At  Speedy  Accord With  Gunmen,
N.Y. Times,  Oct.  10,  1985,  at  Al  (reporting  the  United  States  government's  anger
with  the Italians'  and the Egyptians'  handling  of the incident).
7.  See Achille Lauro Hijacking,  supra note  1, at 3-4(A)  (reporting  the steps the
Italian  government  took to  ready its  military  forces  for  a possible confrontation,  and
quoting Prime Minister Craxi's statement that military force would only be used in the
event  of an "extreme  emergency").
8.  See Achille Lauro Hijacking, supra note  1, at  7(A)  (noting  the  risk  to  the
PLO's  good relations  with  both governments).
9.  Id.
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Arafat  interests  were  in  control,  a  raid  on  the  ship  could  be  very
dangerous.
On October  8, Syria refused  to allow the Achille Lauro to dock and
the  anti-Arafat  PLF  faction  sponsored  by  Syria  denounced  the  hi-
jacking.'0 That same day there were indications  that the hijackers  had
killed  an  American  hostage."
Although  the United States, with the help of Israeli intelligence,  was
able  to  follow  the ship  after it left  Syria  on October  8th,'2  it was  not
able  to mount  a rescue  operation before the ship had sailed  into Egyp-
tian  waters  and into the protection  of Egyptian  sovereignty.1 3
In  Egypt,  a  PLO  delegation,  including Abu  Abbas,  negotiated  with
the  hijackers.'4 Italy encouraged  these meetings,  but the United States
did not. On Wednesday  afternoon,  the hijackers  left the ship, and  offi-
cials  discovered  what the United States  had suspected-that the previ-
ous  day the  hijackers  had  brutally  murdered  a  passenger,  the  wheel-
chair-bound  American,  Leon  Klinghoffer.' 5  That  discovery  released
Italy  from  its  obligation  to  provide  safe  passage  to  the  hijackers  be-
cause  Italy  had  conditioned  its  agreement  on  the  absence  of  serious
violence.' 6
Outraged  both  by  Italy's  negotiation  with  terrorists  and  by  the  re-
lease,  whether  knowing  or unknowing,  of the murderers  of an  Ameri-
can  citizen,  the United  States  issued  strong public  statements.'1  Italy
responded  by  agreeing  to  seek  the  extradition  of  the  four  hijackers
from  Egypt. President Mubarek of Egypt falsely stated that the hijack-
ers  had  already  left  Egypt  and  that  consequently,  he could  be  of no
assistance.'i  Meanwhile,  Israeli  intelligence  sources  provided  informa-
tion that a  man calling  himself Abu  Khaled, who was  associated  with
the hijackers,  was  really  Abu Abbas.  At this  time,  a representative  of
Abu  Abbas'  faction  acknowledged  its  responsibility  for the hijacking.
10.  Id. at 5(A).
11.  See id. at Exhibit  1 (reporting  the communications  between  the hijackers  and
port authorities in Syria during which the hijackers announced  they would kill a second
hostage).
12.  Achille Lauro Hijacking,  supra note  1, at  10(A).
13.  Id. at  I  1 (A).
14.  Id.
15.  Id. at  13(A).
16.  See id. at  15(A)  (relating a statement  made  by  Prime  Minister Craxi  to  the
Italian press implying  that Italy was no longer bound  to commitments  previously made
to secure the  release of the  hijackers).
17.  Id. at  15-16(A).
18.  See id. at  18(A)  (describing reports  obtained  from  Israeli  intelligence  sources
that disclosed that the hijackers  were still  in  Egypt, and  the confirmation  of those  re-
ports by the  National  Security  Agency).
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When  the  United  States  learned  from  reliable  intelligence  sources
that the hijackers  were leaving  Egypt, the National Security Council's
crisis  management  team,  led  by  Vice-Admiral  John  Poindexter,  de-
cided to intercept  the Egyptian  Air plane that would  carry Abu Abbas
and the hijackers out of the country.'9  Intelligence sources were able to
transmit the plane's identification number and flight plan. 0 With Presi-
dent Reagan's  consent, American  Navy  pilots brought down  the plane
at  the NATO  airbase at Sigonella,  Sicily.21 Informed  at the last min-
ute, Prime Minister  Craxi of Italy allowed  the plane to land in Sicily.22
The United  States  did not notify  Craxi that  it would  also land  two
transport planes carrying  Delta Force troops.23 These troops had orders
to  seize  the  passengers  of  the  Egyptian  plane,  transfer  them  to  an
American  plane,  and  fly  them  to  the United States  for  trial.2'  Italian
troops,  however,  prevented  these  aspects  of the United  States'  opera-
tion.25 The Egyptian  plane and its occupants  remained  in  Sicily.
Not  even  the  persuasiveness  of  President  Reagan  could  bring  the
Italian  government  to  turn  over  the  hijackers  to  the  United  States.
Prime Minister  Craxi explained  that relinquishing  the terrorists would
be contrary  to Italian  law.2 8  His reasoning was  that on Italian soil, the
Italian judiciary, not the executive,  had responsibility.  Craxi  did prom-
ise to  arrest  the  hijackers.27  The two  countries,  however,  never  clearly
agreed  on  the fate  of Abu Abbas.
The  Italians  removed  the  four  hijackers  from  the  Egyptian  plane.
The  United  States  and  Italy  congratulated  themselves  in  their  local
media  on the success  of every aspect of the operation,  from the release
of the hostages  to the capture  of their  hijackers.28 Leaders of both na-
19.  Id.
20.  Id. at 18-21(A)  (discussing  the National Security  Council's interception plan).
21.  Id. at 20-21(A).
22.  See Note, An  Analysis of the Achille Lauro Affair: Towards an Effective and
Legal Method of Bringing International  Terrorists to Justice, 9  FoRDAii  INT'  LJ.
328,  337  (1986)  (assessing the legitimacy of the action); see also Recent Development,
Use of Force: Interception of Aircraft, 27  HARV.  INT'L L.J.  761,  767  (1986)  (raising
the issue of the United  States'  infringement  on Egypt's state sovereignty).
23.  Achille Lauro Hijacking, supra note  1, at 23(A).
24.  Id. at 22(A).
25.  Id. at 23(A).
26.  See S.S.  Lotus  (Fr. v.  Turk.),  1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10  (Sept.  7)  (holding
that the  nation whose  fldg  is on the  ship has jurisdiction over  the acts that occur  on
that  ship);  Convention  on  the  High  Seas,  Apr.  29,  1958,  art.  6,  13  US.T.  2313,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200,  450 U.N.T.S. 82,  86. (indicating that Italy had jurisdiction over the
terrorists  because  the hijacking  occurred  on  an Italian-flagged  ship).
27.  Achille Lauro Hijacking, supra note  1, at 2(B).
28.  Id. at 3(B)  (discussing reports  of the  incident in the New York Times and the
New York  Daily News.
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tions commented  warmly  on  their  mutual  cooperation.29  The  Italians,
however, would not relinquish  custody of Abbas and his associates,  who
had helped Egypt negotiate  the return of the Achille Lauro. Moreover,
Egypt insisted  that Abbas  and his associates  were  still within  Egyptian
jurisdiction  in  a hijacked  plane.30  Hence,  other countries  could not  re-
move them.  Since Egyptians  still held  the Achille Lauro and  its crew,
Italy had  to take  Egypt's  views very  seriously.  Italy  did  not  allow  the
plane  to  leave,  however,  because  it  claimed  that  the  testimony  of  its
occupants  might  be  necessary  for  the  investigation  of the  others  in-
volved  in the planning  and  execution  of the hijacking.31
Although  the United States  sought  extradition  of the  four  hijackers
as  a  guarantee  that  they  would  be tried  somewhere,  it  acknowledged
the  primary  jurisdiction  of  the  Italian  judiciary  to  prosecute  crimes
committed  aboard  an  Italian  ship.32  The  differences  between  the
United  States  and  Italy  thus  centered  on  Abu  Abbas.  United  States
Department of Justice  officials obtained  an arrest warrant for Abbas  in
Washington  and requested  the  Italian  government  to perform  a  provi-
sional  arrest."  The United States  believed that this  would allow  forty-
five  days  to successfully  complete  the extradition  process.
Italy, however,  circumvented  its normal  procedure  for handling a re-
quest  for a  provisional  arrest in  an extradition  proceeding.  The Italian
government  announced  that  the  United  States'  request,  though  for-
mally  correct,  did  not,  in  the  Justice  Minister's  opinion,  "satisfy  the
factual  and substantive  requirements  laid  down  by Italian  law."'34 The
Italian  government  allowed  Abbas  to  leave  Italy  and  fly  to
Yugoslavia.
3 5
Reagan  Administration  officials  responded  with  sharp  public  criti-
cism  of the  Italian  government,  stating  that  the  President  felt  "very
angry"36  and "personally  betrayed" 3 7  by Prime  Minister Craxi.  At  the
same  time,  the Italian  press denounced  the United  States.38  This  split
encouraged  a  division  between  the Socialists  and  the Christian  Demo-
29.  Id.
30.  Id. at 5(B).
31.  See  Weinraub,  Extradition Asked  Palestinians in Belgrade-White House
Faults Rome's Decision, N.Y. Times, Oct.  13,  1985,  at Al  (describing  the  incident's
effect  on  American-Italian  relations).
32.  Achille Lauro Hijacking, supra note  1, at 7(B).
33.  Id. at  10(B).
34.  Id. at  11(B).
35.  Id. at  13(B).
36.  Id. at  14(B).
37.  Id.
38.  Id.  at  15(B).
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crats  within  Italy's  coalition  government."9  The  Socialists,  who  had
many other disagreements  with the coalition  leader, took advantage  of
the situation to walk out of Parliament, thereby causing  the dissolution
of the Craxi  government.40
The United States  did not welcome  the support that Craxi promptly
received  from  the Italian  Communist  Party. 41  The  American  govern-
ment  quickly  attempted  to heal  the rift in  Italian-American  relations.
President  Reagan  wrote  a  warm  letter  to  Prime  Minister  Craxi. 2
Shortly  thereafter,  a  new  Craxi government  was formed. 3
Meanwhile,  the  Italian  judiciary  and  prosecutors  proceeded  vigor-
ously. Abu Abbas received a life sentence in absentia  .4 Leon Klinghof-
fer's  killer received  a thirty-year  sentence,  while  the Italian  court sen-
tenced  his  second-in-command  to  twenty-four  years  in jail."5 A  third
hijacker  who had  collaborated  with  Italian  authorities,  received  a  fif-
teen  year  sentence."'  Several  others,  whom  the Italian court  found  to
have  assisted  the hijackers,  received  sentences of six or seven  years.47
A.  AREAS  FOR  INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION
One often perceives  terrorism as a violent activity carried  out by pri-
vate groups  challenging a national government  or some of its policies4 8
This  description,  however,  ignores  a  significant  advantage  that  such
groups  have  in  their  contests  against  sovereign  governments-their
ability  to use the territory  of other states  and thereby  to benefit from
powerful  notions of state  sovereignty.  In  this  way,  terrorists  can often
prevent the direct  intervention  of any other government,  including  the
state which  has  been the victim of the terrorist attack.4,  For example,
by  bringing the Achille Lauro within  Egyptian  territorial  waters,  the
39.  Id. at  16(B).
40.  See Buxton, Italian Coalition Falls  As  Craxi Criticises U.S.,  Fin. Times, Oct.
18,  1985,  sec.  1, at 1 (reporting the  resignation of the Craxi  government).
41.  Achille Lauro Hijacking,  supra note  1, at  17(B).
42.  See Buxton, Craxi  Seeks To Repair Damaged U.S. Relations, Fin. Times, Oct.
24, 1985, sec. 1, at 2 (noting Reagan's and Craxi's attempts to mend relations between
their  two nations).
43.  See Craxi's Coalition Parties Pick up the Reins Again, Fm. Times, Nov.  1,
1985,  sec.  1, at 3  (discussing  the  renewed  coalition  government under  Craxi).




48.  See Levitt,  Is  Terrorism  Worth  Defining?,  13  Omo  N.U.L.  REv.  97,  100
(1986)  (attempting  to define terrorism).
49.  See Nadelmann,  The Role of the United States in the International  Enforce-
ment of Criminal  Law, 31  HARV.  INT'L L.J. 37, 40 (1990)  (surveying the wide array of
agencies  involved  in the battle against  terrorism  in the  United States).
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hijackers  forced  the United  States  to abandon  its plans  for  a  military
assault because such an attack would  have violated Egypt's state sover-
eignty.50  The  problem  is  very  widespread.  It  arises  whenever  a  group
planning or using political violence in or against one state seeks to take
advantage  of the lesser concern of other states about the group's activi-
ties, by seeking  sanctuary or help from them. In this very  common situ-
ation  only  cooperation  among  states  can  prevent  the  violent  act,  dis-
courage  future terrorism,  and punish  the perpetrators.
Relations  between  a  terrorist  group  and  states  to  which  the  group
turns for assistance or sanctuary  range across  a broad spectrum. At one
end,  a sanctuary  state may  not know that a  private group  is preparing
violent  acts  or  seeking  sanctuary  for  its  members  within  that  state's
borders.  Egypt,  for  example,  may  not  have  known  that the  hijackers
were  in  Alexandria.  The  sanctuary state may or may  not make  a  sub-
stantial  effort  to develop  this  intelligence.
Somewhere  further  along  the  spectrum  of involvement,  a  sanctuary
state  may  know  of the  presence  of a  violent  group  but  neither  take
action  against  it,  nor  reveal  this  information  to  the victim state.  Had
Egypt  known  of a  planned  attack on  Israel,  it still might  not have  ac-
ted.  Refusing  to  act  is  far  more  serious  if the  sanctuary  state  knows
that  the  group  is  planning  a  future  act  of violence  than  if the  state
simply knows that the perpetrators  of a prior event are hiding within its
borders.  President  Mubarek's  lie concerning  the  location of the  hijack-
ers may have been unwise, but it did not assist the hijackers  in commit-
ting  a violent  act.
At  the  far  end  of the  spectrum  of involvement,  a  sanctuary  state
might provide  support in the form of money, explosives,  safe places  for
meetings, or false documents. No one knows which state supported Abu
Abbas'  faction  in  the  hijacking  of  the  Achille  Lauro. In  other  in-
stances,  extensive  state support  has  been  readily  identifiable.5 1
To  offset  the ability  of terrorist  groups  to  use a  state for sanctuary,
sanctuary  states  and  other,  nonsanctuary  states  need  to  cooperate  in
three specific areas. These areas are:  (1) sharing intelligence  to prevent
terrorist attacks;  (2)  assisting  in the arrest and trial of the perpetrators;
50.  See supra notes  19-25,  and  accompanying  text  (discussing  the  United  States
response  to  the hijacking).
51.  See Levitt, Democracy Against Terror: The  Western Response to State-Spon-
sored Terrorism 85-92  (1988)  [hereinafter  Democracy Against  Terror] (relating  that
Syria provided  a full range  of support to Nizar  Hindawi,  whom the British  arrested for
attempting  to  place  a  bomb  in  the  luggage  of  his  Irish  girlfriend  as  she  boarded  a
jumbo jet  bound  for Tel  Aviv  on  April  17,  1986).  Hindawi's  trial  fully documented
Syria's  assistance  to him.  Id.
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and  (3) cooperating  to enforce sanctions  against any state government
which  supports  political violence.
The need  for intelligence  information  and  preventive  efforts was ob-
vious in  the Achille Lauro  case. The  governments  of Egypt,  Italy,  or
Tunisia, the home of the PLO, could have  prevented the hijacking  and
killing had they known something about the plans or general  strategies
of either  the PLF  or of the  particular  hijackers.  Sharing  intelligence
could  have  played  a  crucial  role  in  preventing  the  hijacking  of  the
Achille Lauro.
The United States and Israel,  in fact, shared both  strategic and tac-
tical intelligence which helped in locating  and arresting the hijackers. 2
The Israelis  knew  enough  about Abu  Abbas  to know  the pseudonyms
under  which  he  operated.  They  disseminated  that  information  to  the
United States when it was still crucial to determining  which faction of
the PLF was involved.  At an  operational  level the sharing of informa-
tion between  Israel and the United  States enabled the United  States to
follow  the Achille Lauro as it left Syria and  to ascertain  that the hi-
jackers were still at an airbase thirty miles outside Cairo, despite Presi-
dent  Mubarek's  public statements.
53
Cooperation  is equally  essential in arresting  and trying the perpetra-
tors of political violence.  For example, without Egypt's cooperation, the
United States and Italy were unable to prevent the hijackers from leav-
ing  Egypt.  With  Italy's  cooperation,  however,  the  United  States  was
able to bring their plane down in Sicily. American witnesses,  whom the
United States flew to Italy, provided  evidence for use in an Italian trial.
Conversely, a trial in the United States would  have required that Italy
arrest  and extradite Abu  Abbas  and furnish  evidence  for the trial.
Finally,  cooperation  with  a  number o ' states  formally or informally
allied with the victim state is often required if the victim state wants to
punish  a  sanctuary  state  for  providing  assistance  to  a terrorist  group.
This  is  particularly' true if the victim state  contemplates  economic  or
diplomatic  sanctions  or  the  denial  of landing  rights.  These  forms  of
punishment  are  only  effective  if  they  are  widespread.  The  United
States,  for  example,  supported  the United  Kingdom  in imposing  such
sanctions  on  Syria  when  its agent  Hindawi  tried  to destroy  an  El  Al
jumbo jet in  1986.5" The United States  needed the cooperation  of other
nations  when  it  undertook  military  retaliation  against  Libya  for  the
52.  See supra note  12,  and  accompanying  text  (discussing  the information  Israel
shared  with the United  States).
53.  See Achille Lauro Hijacking,  supra note  1, at  18(A)  (describing the National
Security  Council's interception  plan).
54.  Democracy Against Terrorf,  supra note 51,  at  85-92.
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bombing  of a  Berlin  discotheque.5 5  Great Britain  permitted  American
planes  to  take  off from  Great  Britain,  but  France  and  Italy  did  not
allow  them  to fly  over  their territories. 5
B.  ELICITING  COOPERATION  AGAINST  A  TERRORIST  GROUP
How  can  a  state  victimized  by  political  violence  elicit  cooperation
from  a  state  used  as  a  sanctuary  by,  or  providing  assistance  to,  the
violent  group? It can use  its own  political resources  or turn to its allies
for help.  What  is required  depends  upon  the attitude of the sanctuary
state toward  the violent  group.
Regardless of the support or nonsupport  that the sanctuary state pro-
vides to a violent political group,  the sanctuary state's approach toward
the group's  activities  falls  into one of four  broad categories.  First,  like
Italy, it may be strongly opposed to political violence against the victim
state. In that event, its failure  to prevent the use of its territory  by the
group would result from either lack of information  or stronger, compet-
ing  foreign  policy  or  domestic  concerns.  Second,  the  sanctuary  state
may want  to  remain  neutral  in the  contest  between  the  terrorists  and
the  victim  state, like  Egypt  in  the Achille Lauro incident.  Third,  the
sanctuary  state may be an active supporter  of the terrorists.  Fourth, as
in the  case  of Lebanon,  the sanctuary  state  may be unable  to control
the activity within  its own territory because of deep ,and powerful  divi-
sions within  the population.
Obviously,  the  objective  of a victimized  state is to  bring the  sanctu-
ary state  to act  against  the terrorists.  Some alternatives  are primarily
moral  or reputational.  For  example,  the  victim state  may  appeal  to  a
tradition  of  friendship  and  inply  that  indifference  to  its  plight  may
threaten a rich network of common relations and interests. If the victim
state expects the sanctuary  state's population to share its disapproval of
the violence,  it could  appeal  directly to the voting public of the sanctu-
ary  state.  The  victim  state  could  also  appeal  to  international  law  or
treaty  obligations.
If the sanctuary  state tolerates the activities in its territory because it
is  unwilling  to  antagonize  the  terrorist  group  stronger  measures  are
available  to the victim  state.  For  example,  the United  States  and  the
six  other  major  western  nations  that  constitute  the  Summit  Seven"
(the Seven)  effectively threatened  South Africa with the cancellation  of
55.  Id. at 71.
56.  Id.  at  75-77.
57.  The Summit Seven  nations  are:  the  United States,  the United  Kingdom,  Ger-
many,  Italy, France, Japan,  and Canada.
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air traffic  because  of a  failure  to  punish  terrorists.5 8  Similarly,  states
may discourage travel to a particular  nation,  reduce the size of an em-
bassy,  or vote  against  particular  loans.  If Greece refused  to extradite
the terrorist  Rashid, who  detonated  a bomb  on an American jet flying
over  Hawaii,59 the United States could oppose  Greece's  bid to host the
100th  anniversary  of the modern  Olympics  in the name of safety.  Fi-
nally, if the victim state was  dealing  with a sanctuary  state which ac-
tively  supported  terrorism,  the victim  state  could  break  all  economic
and  diplomatic  relations  or,  more  dramatically  respond  militarily,  in-
voking the doctrine of self defense, as the United States did in bombing
Libya. 6
The  victim  state's  capacity  and  willingness  to  bring  any  of  these
pressures  to bear  on the sanctuary  state depends  upon  several  factors.
If the  sanctuary  state  is  politically  or  economically  important  to  the
victim state and its allies, they may  be less willing to take severe mea-
sures.  The sanctuary  state's strategic  situation  may  also influence  the
victim  state's  behavior  towards  it.  For  example,  the  United  States
bombed  Libya; it took lesser measures  against Syria;  it bargained  with
Iran.  The sanctuary  state's  place  in  the contest  between  superpowers
has,  until recently,  also influenced  the victim  state's behavior  towards
it. To  illustrate, an  aerial  attack on  Damascus  would  have involved  a
serious  risk of conflict  with  the Soviet Union.  The United  States  did
not face  that risk when  it attacked  Tripoli.
History also plays  a  role, for  it affects  the attitude of a victim state
and  its  allies  toward  a  sanctuary  state.  Italy  has  historic  as  well  as
economic  ties with Libya;  France has similar links to Syria.0 " As  a re-
sult,  Italy  and  France  will  be  less  willing  to  adopt  severe  measures
against  Libya and Syria  when they  offer sanctuary  to terrorists.
The victim state's  capacity  to  use some  types  of sanctions,  particu-
larly  economic and diplomatic  measures, to persuade  a sanctuary  state
to take action against a terrorist  group generally depends upon  the vic-
tim  state's  ability  to  rally  influential  allies.  Without  a  broad  base  of
support  for  the victim state  from  allied nations,  a sanctuary  state  can
58.  Democracy Against Terror, supra note  51,  at 55-56.
59.  Jenkins, Seeking the Extradition  of Mohammed Rashid, at 13  (1990)  [herein-
after  Extradition of Rashid]  (discussing  the  negotiations  between  Greece  and  the
United  States for the  extradition of Rashid  to the  United States)  (available from the
Case Program, John F. Kennedy  School of Government,  Harvard  University,  Kennedy
School  Case No. C16-90-982.0).
60.  Democracy Against Terror, supra note 51,  at 71.
61.  See D. PERETz,  THE MIDDLE  EAST TODAY  396-407  (4th ed.  1983)  (describing
the  political situation  during the  French  mandate  for Syria).
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and will simply compensate  elsewhere  for measures  taken against it by
the victim  state.
Because  the Summit  Seven  share  a  common  concern  about  terror-
ism,  they  may  cooperate  to  effectively  pressure  any  state  providing
sanctuary  to terrorists. Acting  together, the  Seven can bring very  pow-
erful  economic  threats  or  diplomatic  measures  against  any  sanctuary
state that supports political violence against one of the seven. Regretta-
bly, numerous  factors limit the capacity  of the Seven to act  in concert
against  terrorism.
Each of the Seven has different foreign  policy commitments  and ties.
France  and Italy have  historic,  economic,  and demographic  ties to the
Middle  East which  the United States, the United Kingdom,  Germany,
Canada,  and  Japan  do not share.  In addition,  each of the  Seven must
confront different domestic political pressures when dealing with terror-
ism.  With  a  large  and  passionate  Irish-American  population,  the
United  States  has  often  been  slow  to  extradite  IRA  terrorists.62  Ger-
many  must  deal  with  terrorism  in light  of its  history  of Nazi  oppres-
sion.  Each  of the Seven  are subject  to different  dangers  of retaliation
from a politically violent group or its state sponsors  depending  on phys-
ical  proximity,  ease of travel, and the nationality  of any  hostage  being
held. Such  differences  would  not affect  a state's capacity to exert pres-
sure on  a sanctuary  state if, as  the United States  has often  urged, the
victim state and its allies all viewed  opposition to terrorism  as a matter
of fundamental  morality, and agreed  that one  should never  make  con-
cessions  to  terrorists.  Such  agreement,  however,  does  not  even  exist
among  the United States'  closest  allies.
Certainly  Italy rejected  this notion  in  the Achille Lauro case.  Italy
believed  it proper  to handle  terrorism  in  any  way  designed  to  save the
lives  and property of endangered  citizens.  For  Italy, the attack merely
reflected  the perpetually  amoral  world  of the  Middle East,  where  ter-
rorism  is  a familiar  tool of foreign  policy. Italy hopes  to retain  an im-
portant  role  in  this  world.  Even  the  United  States  has  Jot  been
steadfast  in its claim  that  countries  should  remove  terrorismrom  the
world  of  prudential  and  foreign  policy  concerns  and  instead  should
treat it as  a strict matter of right and wrong  under the  applicable  rule
of law.  President  Reagan  dealt  with  Iran,  offering  TOW  missiles  in
exchange  for  the release  of hostages.
62.  See  Comment,  The  Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act  of
1986: Prescribing  and Enforcing United States Law Against Terrorist Violence Over-
seas, 37  UCLA L.  REV.  985,  1008  (1990)  (describing  two  cases  in which  IRA mem-
bers carried  out terrorist attacks in Great Britain but U.S. courts, applying  the political
offense  exception,  refused  to  extradite  the attackers).
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The United States  cannot use economic  and diplomatic  sanctions  to
overcome the different approaches  among its closest  allies to threats  of
political violence.  These approaches  are deeply  rooted in foreign policy,
politics,  economics,  exposure  to  retaliation,  and  history.  Each  of the
Seven would  be  extremely  reluctant  to  invoke  harsher  forms  of influ-
ence against the others to obtain cooperation  against a sanctuary state.
Too many  beneficial  relationships bind these countries  to each other to
risk rupture  over the issue of cooperation  in fighting particular  terrorist
groups.  The  most  one of the Seven  can  do is  encourage  the  other six
states  to  cooperate  in  dealing  with  a  common  threat  of political  vio-
lence in order  to increase the capacity of each  to put pressure on states
which would  otherwise  support  political  violence or remain  neutral.
C.  INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION  IN  GATHERING  INTELLIGENCE
AND  PREVENTING  POLITICAL  VIOLENCE
As we  saw in the Achill  Lauro case, intelligence sharing about ter-
rorist groups  is one of the crucial  forms of assistance  from and  among
allies. States  such  as  Israel, the United States,  Italy,  Germany, Spain,
and the United Kingdom  do in fact share information  about the activi-
ties of terrorist  groups,  changes  in  their  organizational  structure,  the
movement  of  their  members,  and  their  operational  plans.  Such  ex-
changes  of  information  have  apparently  enabled  Germany  to  arrest
Hamadei63 and Greece to arrest Rashid.'" They have also led to a num-
ber of seizures of weapons  and equipment. The benefits of friendly  gov-
ernments sharing  information  about a common  threat are obvious,  but
even  this core type  of cooperation  cannot be taken  for granted.
Almost  every  western  state  separates  foreign  and  domestic  intelli-
gence gathering  from  law enforcement.  This  internal  division of labor
results in a host of difficulties in bringing about cooperation  among the
various  agencies  of even  a  single country.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that
these problems  are compounded when cooperation  with another state is
attempted,  either  at  an  informal  working  level  or  at  higher  levels
through  more formal  arrangements.
States may choose to defend themselves  against terrorism by not co-
operating with a  friendly state  that is the  primary target  of terrorists.
63.  See  generally Kennedy,  The  Extradition of Mohammed Hamadel, (1988)
[hereinafter  The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei] (explaining  the events  leading
up to Germany's  denial of Hamadei's  extradition)  (available from  the Case Program,
John  F. Kennedy  School  of Government,  Harvard  University,  Kennedy  School  Case
No. C15-88-835.0).
64.  See generally Extradition of Rashid, supra note 59 (relating the steps that the
United States  took with regard  to Rashid's extradition).
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Alternatively,  its  foreign  policy  concerns  may  dictate  noncooperation.
In  either  event, withholding  crucial  intelligence  is  unlikely  to  harm  a
friendly relationship because the victim state cannot  denounce a  failure
to deliver  information  which  it  is  not certain  that  the  noncooperating
state possesses.
States  concerned  that strong  action  by  them  against  particular  ter-
rorist  groups  might  lead  to  reprisals  or  adverse  foreign  policy  conse-
quences are aware that inaction requires  hiding their knowledge  of ter-
rorist activities,  in other words,  not sharing  intelligence  information.  If
a  state reveals  that it is dealing  with  terrorists  or providing  them  with
sanctuary,  large segments  of its own  public and  allied foreign  govern-
ments  are  likely  to react with  outrage.  Having  extensive  knowledge  of
ongoing terrorist activities within  the state's borders  is likely to be seen
as  evidence that a state is secretly providing  such  aid or asylum to ter-
rorists.  It may seem  wiser  to withhold  the  information  for  this reason
as  well  as  because terrorists  will  view sharing  intelligence  about  them
as  a  hostile  act.
Moreover,  unlike  law  enforcement  agents  who  often  identify  them-
selves  as  members  of a  common  profession  and  cooperate  informally
with  each  other,  intelligence  agents  are  trained  not to  share  informa-
tion,  to  classify  what  they  learn,  and  to  protect  their  sources  at  all
costs.  Although  frequent  and personal  relations can  partially  overcome
inhibitions  on the transfer of information  between intelligence  services,
intelligence  organizations  must frequently  stamp  intelligence  informa-
tion with  requirements  of "no  foreign  dissemination."
This  reluctance  to  share  intelligence  information  with  other  states
would  pose  less  of a  problem  if intelligence  information  flowed  freely
back and forth between  intelligence  and law enforcement  agencies.  Po-
lice agencies have a greater tradition of sharing informatiorracross  bor-
ders,  but  a  "no  foreign  dissemination"  stamp  will  prevent  those  agen-
cies  from  communicating  the  information  to  law  enforcement
colleagues  in  other  friendly  states.  Intelligence,  defense,  and  foreign
ministry  officials,  moreover,  perceive  a special risk in letting  even  their
own  law  enforcement  colleagues  have  access to information.  By law  in
many  European  countries,  and  by  practice  in  the United  States,  this
disclosure  would  generate a prompt  demand for investigation  and pros-
ecution  of any  criminal  activity-actions  that  terrorist  groups  would
view  as hostile. Thus, even  when national governments  invite their judi-
ciary and police  to assist foreign  governments,  these  agencies  often  do
not have  access  to vital  information.
Even  if the  necessary  information  were  made  available  to  law  en-
forcement  officials  for  sharing  with  foreign  colleagues,  administrative
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problems  would  harmfully  affect the formal systems of daily exchange
of information  among  national  law enforcement  organizations.  For ex-
ample,  the  International  Criminal  Police  Organization,  known  as  In-
terpol,  has  until  recently  taken  a  very expansive  view  of what  consti-
tutes  a  political  offense. 5  While  personal  relations  can  replace  such
formal systems  and facilitate the exchange  of information,  regular ac-
cess to foreign counterpart agencies and facilitating arrangements,  such
as periodic  conferences,  are necessary for personal relations to be effec-
tive.  Although  the United  States  and Germany  are leaders  in  placing
law enforcement personnel  in other countries, the number of even these
countries'  law  enforcement  agents  abroad  is  very  small  and  their  re-
sponsibilities  cover  other  areas  in  addition  to  terrorism.  Intelligence
agents with a foreign policy or defense interest are  much more likely to
have  the  overseas  presence  that  creates  personal  exchanges.  Foreign
ministry  representatives  and intelligence  officers,  not law  enforcement
officials,  generally chair  conferences  that are designed  to explore  mat-
ters  of shared  interest  in terrorist  activities.  As  a  result,  law  enforce-
ment  personnel  are  left  without  official  occasions  for  exchanging
information.
If terrorism at  home  is viewed  as  a  domestic  issue of criminal  law
and terrorism abroad is perceived  as another state's problem, often best
avoided,  there  is  no  great inclination  to develop  cooperative  processes
for  sharing information.  Nations  have begun  to change  their attitudes
toward  terrorism  abroad  as  a  result  of the  United  States'  efforts  to
combat  international  terrorism  in  the  1980's,  particularly  the  United
States'  bombing of Libya. Yet, the problem  remains. At its root lies a
simple  fact-maintaining  a  state's  freedom  to  deal  as  it wishes  with
terrorists  often  requires  hiding  crucial  information  from  that  state's
own population, friendly governments,  and the law enforcement system.
65.  M. ANDERSON,  POLICING THE WORLD:  INTERPOL AND  THE POLITICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL  POLICE  COOPERATION  (1989); see  L.  GREILSAMER,  INTERPOL,  LE SI  GE  DU
SOUPCON  (1986)  (providing an overview  of the organization's history).  Interpol is head-
quartered  in France and is  composed  chiefly  of police officials  on  assignment from na-
tional governments.  Interpol acts primarily as a repository and clearinghouse  for infor-
mation  on crime and  criminals.
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II.  UNILATERAL  ACTION  AND  INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION  IN THE  DETENTION  AND  TRIAL  OF
TERRORISTS
A.  THE  UNILATERAL  ALTERNATIVE:  THE  ARREST  OF  FAWAZ
YOUNIS
A state that is the victim of political  violence may not need its allies'
cooperation  to apprehend  and try the perpetrators.  That state may find
the perpetrators within  its own borders, and if the event took place do-
mestically,  all of the evidence  may  be available within the jurisdiction.
If the violent  act  was  not  local,  the victim  state  may  be  able  to  act
against the perpetrators abroad  if it knows where  they are. Sometimes
secret  and  illegal intelligence  operations  are used.  Israel's Mossad  sup-
posedly executed  most of the members  of the  terrorist group that mur-
dered  Israeli  athletes  in  Munich.  British  military  agents  killed  three
members  of the  Irish  Revolutionary  Army  (IRA)  in  a  Gibraltar  inci-
dent  that British  authorities  have  never  adequately  explained.
Sometimes  a state can  unilaterally  seize  the perpetrators  of political
violence  abroad  and  bring  them  back  for  trial  in  the  victim  country
while preserving the rule of law. The case of Fawaz Younis," 6  a twenty-
eight  year  old  Lebanese  man  whom  FBI  agents  lured  onto a  yacht  in
international  waters  in the fall  of 1987,  is an example. The FBI agents
arrested  Younis  and  transported  him  to  the  United  States,  where  he
was tried  and  convicted  for  involvement  in  the  1985  hijacking and  de-
struction of a Jordanian  airliner at  Beirut International  Airport.  Using
Younis'  friend  as  its  agent,  the  FBI  fabricated  a  drug  deal  on  the
yacht.  Younis  voluntarily  went  from Cypress  to  the  yacht.
Abducting Younis  from the territory  of another state would have vio-
lated international  law, unless it could be justified as self-help against a
sanctuary state  that was knowingly  assisting  Younis  in further  attacks
on  the  United  States.  Because  the FBI  abducted  Younis  on  the  high
seas, state sovereignty  was not an issue.  Even  if the  Universal Declara-
tion  on  Human  Rights6"  and  the  International  Covenant  on Civil  and
66.  See generally Jenkins,  Bringing Terror to Justice (1990)  [hereinafter  Bringing
Terror to  Justice] (relating  the  events  leading  to  the  abduction  and  trial 'of Fawaz
Younis)  (available  from  the Case Program,  John  F. Kennedy  School  of Government,
Harvard  University,  Kennedy  School  Case  No.  C96-90-960.0);  see  also Lowenfeld,
Special Issue: The  United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs:
Constitutional  Law-International  Law:  U.S.  Law Enforcement Abroad: The Consti-
tution and International Law,  83  AM.  J.  INT'L  L.  880,  880-81  (1989)  (discussing
Fawaz  Yunis'  arrest  and  detention  in light of its  constitutional  implications).
67.  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed Dec.  10,  1948,  G.A. Res. 217A
(III)  at  71,  U.N.  Doc.  A/810  (1948).
[VOL.  6:1INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION
Political Rights" 8  were binding treaties that the United States had rati-
fied,  the  seizure  would  not  have  been  in violation  of either  treaty.68
Protection  against arrest  abroad  is not a  traditional human right.  The
only  applicable  provisions  of  the  Declaration  and  the  Cove-
nant-protection  against "arbitrary  arrest  [and]  detention" 70-seem  to
be directed at repressive domestic practices rather than at arrests under
valid arrest warrants  where law enforcement  officials  promptly present
the suspect  before a  court.
Under  international  law,  the  United  States  may  properly  apply  its
laws extra-territorially in several circumstances: against its own nation-
als;71  when  the  protective  principle 2  is  involved  because the  criminal
acts threaten the security of the United States; and when the defendant
commits  a  crime  that  is  universally  recognized  as  heinous.1 3  In  most
cases  of political  violence  against  American  vital  interests,  either  the
protective  principle74  or the  notion  of universal  offense  applies.78  For
instance,  Younis'  hijacking  and destruction  of a Jordanian  airplane  on
an  international  route  implicated  the  universal  offense  principle.  In-
deed,  there  are  several  international  agreements-the  Montreal, 8
Hague,77  Tokyo,78 and  Hostage7 9  Conventions-that  provide  for  gen-
68.  International  Covenant  on  Civil and  Political  Rights,  adopted Dec.  16,  1966,
entered into force Mar. 23,  1976, G.A.  Res. 2200  (XXI),  21  U.N. GAOR,  Supp. (No.
16)  at 52,  U.N. Doc. A/6546  (1966).
69.  His  treatment  did,  of course,  raise serious  moral  issues.  During the  five  days
before  his  arraignment  in  Washington,  D.C.,  he  was  locked  in  a small  room  for  an
extended  period of time, drugged and then shipped in  a small fighter plane across the
Atlantic Ocean.
70.  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and Political  Rights, supra note  68, at  54.
71.  Democracy Against Terror, supra note 51,  at 71.
72.  RESTATEMENT  (THuRD)  OF  FOREIGN  RELATIONs LAW  §  402(3)  (1987).  The
protective  principle is the idea that a state may  prescribe laws  regarding "certain  con-
duct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the secur-
ity of the state or against a limited class of other state interests."  Id.
73.  Id. § 404.
74.  The  protective  principle  applies  to offenses  that  threaten  the  security  of the
state and the integrity of its governing  bodies,  but does  not allow states to create laws
prohibiting  political  expression. Id. § 402,  comment f.
75.  Id. § 404. A state may proscribe and  punish "offenses  recognized  by the  com-
munity  of nations  as of universal  concern,  such  as  piracy,  slave  trade, attacks  on  or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps  certain acts of terrorism.  ."
Id. That the  crimes  listed  in  this  section  are  subject  to  universal jurisdiction  is  the
result of the evolution  of customary international  law and  the interests  of all states  in
suppressing  these crimes.  Id. at  comment a.
76.  Convention  for the  Suppression  of Unlawful  Acts  Against  the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23,  1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177  [herein-
after Montreal Convention]  (entering into force in the United States on Jan. 26,  1973).
77.  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful  Seizure of Aircraft, Dec.  16,  1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S.  105  [hereinafter Hague Convention]
(entering  into force  in the  United States on Oct.  14,  1971).
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eral  jurisdiction  over  such  offenses  in  every  signatory  state,  thereby
strengthening  the  claim  that the universal  principle  applies.
Thus  empowered  under  international  law,  the  United  States  has
passed  several  statutes  with  extraterritorial  reach. 80 Typical  and  perti-
nent to the Younis case is the Aircraft Sabotage  Act of 1984. This Act
applies  to anyone who  "destroys  a civil  aircraft registered  in  a country
other than the United States"  so long  as the offender  "is  later found  in
the  United  States."  81  The  Hostage Taking  Act  of  1984  also  applies
when "the  offender is found in the United States.8 2 The phrase "found
in  the United States"  includes  people  who have been  brought  into  the
United  States.  The  presence  requirement  is  simply  a  means  to  deter-
mine  which  state may  bring  charges.
There  are  no  consitutional  administrative  obstacles  to  seizing  sus-
pected  terrorists  abroad.8"  President  Reagan  signed  a  classified  direc-
tive that authorized the CIA to take such actions.84 The Department of
State  has  publicly  taken  the position  that nothing  in international  law
prohibits  the United  States  from  capturing  terrorists  in  international
waters  or  air space.
Thus, when  a suspect  is in international  waters,  there is no legal bar
to  unilateral  action  to seize,  detain,  and bring  back  promptly for trial
someone  who  has violated  the laws  of the victim state, even abroad,  so
long  as  the sovereignty of an innocent  state is not invaded and the vic-
tim  state  has  a  sufficiently  recognized  basis  for  asserting  jurisdiction.
The  situation  is,  of course,  radically  different  if the  operation  invades
the  sovereignty  of  another  nation.  In  the  Achille  Lauro  case,  the
United  States  forced  an Egyptian  airliner  to  the ground,  but  Italy  re-
78.  Convention  on Offenses  and Certain  Other Acts Committed  on Board Aircraft,
Sept.  14,  1963,  20  U.S.T.  2941,  T.I.A.S.  No.  6768,  704  U.N.T.S.  219  [hereinafter
Tokyo  Convention]  (entering  into force  in the United  States on  Dec.  14,  1969).
79.  International  Convention  Against the  Taking  of Hostages,  G.A.  Res.  34/146,
34 U.N. GAOR Supp.  (No. 46)  at 245, U.N. Doc.  A/C.6/34/L.23  (1979),  reprinted
in  18  I.L.M.  1456  [hereinafter  Hostages  Convention].
80.  See Aircraft  Sabotage  Act of  1984,  18  U.S.C.  §§  31,  32  (1988)  (stating  that
acts  of airplane violence will either  receive a  $100,000  fine or a  prison sentence of not
more than  twenty years);  Act for the Prevention  and Punishment of the Crime of Hos-
tage-Taking  of 1984,  18 U.S.C. § 1203  (1988)  [hereinafter  Hostage-Taking Act] (pro-
viding  that anyone  who  takes  hostages  will  receive  a  prison  term  of- any number  of
years  or life imprisonment).
81.  Aircraft  Sabotage  Act  § 32(b)(2).
82.  Hostage-Taking  Act § 1203(b)(1)(B).
83.  See Ker  v.  Illinois,  119  U.S.  436  (1886)  (deciding  that the  state  could try a
defendant brought within the court's jurisdiction through forcible abduction); Frisbie v.
Collins,  342 U.S.  519  (1952)  (affirming  the trial  court's  conviction  of the  defendant
even  though the state acquired  jurisdiction  by  force).
84.  Walcott  and  Paszter,  Reagan Ruling Let  C.LA.  Kidnap Terrorists Overseas
Disclosed, Wall St.  J.,  Feb. 20,  1987,  at Al.
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fused  to  disregard  Egypt's  claim  of jurisdiction  and  forcibly  remove
Abu  Abbas  from the plane. The United States could  not seize  the hi-
jackers  because  the plane was  on Italian  soil.
This incident  served  as  a  sharp  reminder  of the limits of unilateral
action.  The occasions on which it has been tried, such as the Eichmann
case,85 are famous  but few.  Unilateral  action  is  rarely legal.  The costs
of  ignoring  international  law  can  be  great.  A  wiser  way  to  bring to
justice a suspect located abroad  is  to seek the cooperation of the sanc-
tuary  state  in  extraditing  him  to  the  victim state  or  bringing him to
trial.
B.  THE  POWER  AND  LiMITs  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  IN
COMPELLING  COOPERATION:  THE  HIJACKING  OF  TWA  FLIGHT  847
Alternatives  to unilateral  action  exist.  On June  14,  1985,  Arab  ter-
rorists  hijacked TWA  flight  847  en route  to  Rome  from Athens  and
forced  the  crew  to  fly  to  Beirut.8 8  In  Beirut  the  hijackers  killed  an
American  Navy  diver,  Robert  Stethem,  and  held  thirty-nine  passen-
gers,  who were mainly  Americans, and  the crew  hostage for seventeen
days.8 17 Eighteen months  later Germany arrested one of the accused  hi-
jackers,  Mohammed Ali Hamadei, a  twenty-two year old Lebanese, as
he departed from a plane in Frankfurt, West Germany.88 Hamadei was
carrying  a suitcase full of explosives. 8 " Someone  had provided essential
intelligence  to  the West  Germans.
The United States immediately  sought  Hamadei's extradition under
its  treaty  with  Germany. 0  Like  many  other  countries,  the  United
85.  Attorney  General  v.  Eichmann,  36  I.L.R.  277  (Sup.  Ct.  1962).  See  P.
PAPADATOS,  THE  Eicm  Lk  TRIAL  (1964)  (discussing  problems and questions arising
from the Eichmann  trial);  Fawcett,  The Eichmann Case, 38  BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L.  181
(1962)  (considering whether  Israel  exceeded  state jurisdiction  when it abducted  Eich-
mann while he was abroad);  Treves, Jurisdictional  Aspects of the Elchmann Case, 47
MNiNN.  L. Rnv.  557  (1963)  (analyzing  whether  Israel's  exercise  of jurisdiction  was
proper under  existing  principles of international  law).
86.  See  generally Kennedy,  Stein  and  Rubin,  The Extradition of Mohammed
Hamadei, 31  HARv.  INT'L  L.J. 5,  5  (1990)  (discussing  the TWA 847 incident);  The
Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, supra note 63  (reviewing  the United States'  ef-
forts  to extradite Hamadei  from Germany).
87.  The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, supra note  63,  at  1.
88.  Id.
89.  Markham,  Hijacking Suspect Arrested Bonn, N.Y.  Times,  Jan.  16,  1987,  at
Al.
90.  Treaty  Between  the  United  States of America  and The  Federal  Republic of
Germany, June  20,  1978,  32  U.S.T.  1485, T.I.A.S.  No. 9785,  (entering  into force in
the  United  States  on  Aug.  20,  1980)  [hereinafter  Extradition  Treaty].  The  United
States and West Germany  have since revised their extradition treaty, but it was not in
force  at the time of the TWA  847  hijacking.  Supplemental  Treaty  of Oct.  21,  1986,
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States does not recognize  the obligation  to extradite without a treaty.91
In  this case,  the German-American  treaty,  combined  with  the  United
States'  significant  contacts  with  the  hijacking,  enabled  the  United
States  to seek the extradition  of the Lebanese hijacker. The  plane  was
American,  there  were  numerous American  passengers,9 2 an  American
homicide victim,  and  a  careful  effort by  the hijackers  to  identify  and
terrorize American  passengers. These facts, and  the absence of German
interests  and contacts,  made the case close to perfect for extradition.  In
addition,  the Aircraft Sabotage Act and the Hostage Taking Act gave
the United  States  extraterritorial  reach  in cases  of hostage  taking,  hi-
jacking,  and  aircraft  sabotage.93
International  treaties  and  understandings  among  long-term  allies,
who are linked by close  economic  and political  ties, can provide  a pow-
erful  force in international relations. Treaties of extradition and mutual
assistance  in  obtaining  evidence  are,  however,  regularly  written  with
room  for  political  judgment  about  their  applicability.  The  procedures
for  compliance  generally  require  not  only  action  by  the  courts  of the
"requested"  state,  for  instance  Germany  in  Hamadei's  case,  but  also
approval  by  that state's political  authorities.
The  legal  obligations  under  the  German-American  treaty  are  in-
structive  because  they  are  common  to  most  extradition  treaties.
9 4
Under  this  treaty,  Germany  had  several  alternatives  for  handling
Hamadei.  First, it could  have extradited  him to the United  States, as-
suming  the  United  States  had  filed  a  proper  request.95  Second,  Ger-
many  could  have tried  him in  a German  court for violation of German
statutes  under  the  theory  that his  hijacking  and  hostage  taking  were
universal  crimes.  If Hamadei's  acts  were  universal  crimes,  any  state
could  try  Hamadei  under  international  law  so  long  as  the acts  were
forbidden  by  the  state's  domestic  law  as  well.  German  scholars  assert
United States-West  Germany,  S.  TREATY  Doc.  No.  6,  100th  Cong.,  Ist Sess.  (1987),
1988  Bundesgesetzblatt  11 1086  (W. Ger.).
91.  M.  BAssIouNI,  INTERNATIONAL  EXTRADITION  AND  WORLD  PUBLIC  ORDER  7
(1974);  I.  SHEARER,  EXTRADITION  IN  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  24  (1974).  Generally,
there is no  obligation to extradite  in the absence  of a  treaty.
92.  See Berger, Hijackers  Release Over 60 From Jet Algiers Airport, N.Y. Times,
June  16,  1985, at Al  (noting that the act was  clearly  aimed against  Americans).  The
hijackers  sorted  out  United  States  passports  from  the  others,  looking  especially  for
those of American  servicemen.  Id.
93.  See supra notes 80-82  and accompanying text (relating  the ramifications of the
Aircraft  Sabotage Act and  the Hostage  Taking  Act).
94.  See  Extradition Treaty,  supra note  90,  and accompanying  text (discussing  the
United  States-West Germany  Extradition  Treaty).
95.  See id. art.  14  (describing  the  steps  necessary  to  make  a  formal  request  for
extradition).
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and defend  an alternative, rarely  used, basis  for asserting  international
jurisdiction: that the state having custody of an individual  who is  prop-
erly sought  for extradition  always  has  the option  of trying the individ-
ual  in  its own  domestic  courts  instead. 6  Third,  Germany  could  have
initially  tried  Hamadei  only  for  attempting  to  import  explosives  and
other arms, thus delaying  the questions  of extradition  and trial for  hi-
jacking, hostage taking, and murder. Germany then could  have waited
for the expiration of Hamadei's sentence for these  crimes before facing
the other issues. A final option for Germany might not satisfy its treaty
obligations.  As  a  practical  matter,  Germany  could  have  released
Hamadei, as Italy had done with Abu Abbas in the Achille Lauro case.
The extradition  treaty  left  Germany  free to  choose  among the  first
three alternatives.  When the suspect is  in the requested state's custody,
extradition  treaties  generally  offer  the  requested  state  the choice  of
trial  or  extradition  and  the  choice as  to  the sequence  of trials  if the
requested  state  may  bring  more  than one  charge.  Many  international
law scholars might argue that the preferable  system would  be to extra-
dite when the requesting  state has  far better reasons for trying the sus-
pect  than the requested  state. International  law,  however,  does not es-
tablish  this.  Because  Germany  had  several  legally  valid  options  for
handling  Hamadei,  political  considerations  determined  Germany's
choice  of action.
Even  Germany's final alternative, releasing  Hamadei,  might not have
violated the treaty requirement that he either stand trial in Germany or
that Germany extradite him to the United  States. That requirement in
the treaty  depends  upon  a  number  of conditions. The  crime for  which
the requesting  state seeks  the suspect must  also  be  a  serious  crime in
the requested state. 97  The United States'  claim  to jurisdiction  over  the
events  charged  must  fall  within  a  recognized  international  jurisdic-
tion.98  The  requesting  state must  have behaved  reciprocally  in similar
circumstances,9 9  and another  state  cannot  have  already  tried the sus-
pect  for  the same  crime.10
Several  of these  conditions often  remain unsatisfied.  In Italy, for ex-
ample,  terrorists are generally charged  with associaziome,  the crime of
participating  in a group seeking  to destabilize  the government  or com-
96.  See Meyer,  The Vicarious Administration of Justice" An Overlooked Basis of
Jurisdiction,  31  HARV.  INT'L L.J.  108,  115-16  (1990)  (discussing the punitive power of
the state and various  theories  for asserting jurisdiction).
97.  Extradition Treaty,  supra note  90, art.  1(2)(a).
98.  Id. art.  10.
99.  Id. art.  1(1).
100.  Id. art. 8.
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mit acts against the state.1 01 There is no parallel  to associaziome in  the
statutes  of many  other  states,  and  consequently  they do  not  extradite
terrorists  charged  with  this crime.  France,  for example,  has  denied  the
extradition  of  many  terrorists  charged  with  associaziome in  Italy.10
Furthermore,  it  would  be  difficult  for  Italy  to  rewrite  its  statutes  to
make  them  coincide  with  those  of its  neighboring  states,  particularly
when  different  neighbors  have  different  laws.
Germany,  like  many  other states  with  a  civil  law  tradition,  will  not
extradite  one of its own  nationals  for trial in another state.10 3 This was
not  a  problem  in  Hamadei's  case,  since  Hamadei  was  not  a  German
citizen. Having  prohibited the death penalty, 04  Germany  would not ex-
tradite  if the death  sentence  were  possible  in the extraditing  state;  but
the requesting  state could  satisfy Germany  by providing  assurance  that
it  would  not  impose  this  sentence.1 05  Finally,  it  is  very  important  to
note that  under treaties  requiring  extradition  or  trial, a  state  is gener-
ally  bound  only  to  submit  its  case  to  its  prosecuting  officials.  These
treaties  do not require a  state to actually try the  offender in  a court of
law.  Prosecutors  can  simply  examine  the  case  and  decide  not  to
prosecute. 08
Whether  or  not a  requesting  state has  met  these  conditions  may  be
largely  a  technical  question,  although  on several  occasions  France has
relied  on strained  interpretations  of its  extradition treaties  to mask  its
political  concerns  and  refuse  to  extradite  terrorists  to  Germany  or
Israel.  In January  1977,  for example, France released Abu Daoud, who
101.  Martin,  Richard  A.,  Representative  of  the  Dept.  of  Justice  at  the  United
States  Embassy  in Rome, Italy, Draft Report  on International  Cooperation  on Terror-
ism  5 (July  9,  1989)(available  from  The Center  for  Criminal  Justice,  Harvard  Law
School).
102.  Id.
103.  GRUNDGESETZ  [G.G.]  art.  16(2)  (W. Ger.).
104.  Id. art.  102.
105.  See Extradition Treaty, supra note  90, art.  12  (stating that extradition  will  be
denied  "when  the  offense  for  which  extradition  is  requested  is  punishable  by  death
under the laws  of the requesting state and the laws of the requested state do not permit
such  punishment  for the  offense");  Lagadny, Die Rechtsstellung des Auszuliefernden
in der Bundesrepublik  Deutschland,  reprinted  in BEITRAGE UND  MATERIALEN  AUS  DEM
MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT  FUR  AUSLANDISCHES  UND  INTERNATIONALES  STRAFRECHT  48,
351  (1987)  (discussing  Germany's  responsibility  under  its Constitution  for Hamadei's
treatment  after extradition).
106.  See Frei and Trechsel,  Origins  and Applications of the United States-Switzer-
land Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 31  HARV.  INT'L L.J.  77,  80-
81  (1990)  (noting  that prosecutorial  discretion  is  more constrained  in  some  legal sys-
tems  than  in  others).  Continental  legal  systems  typically  operate  on  the  principle  of
"legality,"  whereby  prosecution  must commence  whenever  reasonable  suspicion  exists.
Id. Little discretion  resides  in police or  prosecutors as to which  charges,  if any, should
be brought. Id.
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was  suspected  of masterminding  the  1972  terrorist  attack at the Mu-
nich  Olympics,  even  though  both West  Germany  and Israel  had  filed
prompt  requests  for his extradition.  The Paris Cour dAppel dismissed
both  requests  on  technical  grounds.  Most  observers  believe,  however,
that fear of terrorist retribution  and a desire to maintain  good relations
with Arab states  motivated  the decision.
In those cases,  France could have  relied on the famous "political  of-
fense"  exception  to  extradition  obligations.  Found  in  almost  every
treaty,  the exception  allows  the judicial  and political authorities of the
requested state to refuse extradition  on the ground that the crime itself
was  "political."' 07 The  political  offense  exception  to  the obligation  to
extradite  or try has  a devastating  impact on the  few international  con-
ventions  outlawing  airplane  hijacking,  attacks  on diplomats  and other
"internationally  protected persons,"  and hostage taking. None of these
international  conventions  provides  for  effective  sanctions against states
that ignore their obligations,  and  states can interpret the "political  of-
fense"  exception  very broadly.
Even  when  close  allies  are  involved,  as  in  the  case  of the  United
States  and  the  United  Kingdom,  Israel,  Germany,  France,  or  Italy,
there  is  no  agreement  on  what  constitutes  a  political  offense.  The
United  States  has  departed  substantially  from  its  early  19th  century
tradition  of identifying  with  revolutionary  causes.  Today,  the United
States  would  eliminate  the political  offense  exception  for ordinary  vio-
lent  crimes,  at  least if soldiers  or  other  security  forces  were  not  the
targets of the crimes. The new British-American  treaty adopts  this gen-
eral direction. 08
Greece's  interpretation  of  political  offenses  is  opposite  that  of  the
United States.  An example is the case of Al  Zumar, a Palestinian  ter-
rorist. Italy requested  extradition of Zumar  from Greece after he par-
ticipated  in the bombing  of a  synagogue  in  Rome that injured  dozens
107.  See generally C. VAN  DEN  WIJNGAERT,  THE POLITICAL OFFENSE  EXCEPTION
TO  EXTRADITION  (1980)  (providing an  extensive discussion of the political offense con-
cept, its definition,  and how nations do and should use it); See also Extradition Treaty,
supra note 90, art. 4(1)  (finding the formulation  in the German-American  treaty to be
typical:  "Extradition  shall  not  be  granted  if the offense  in  respect of which  it  is  re-
quested is regarded by the Requested States as a political offense, an offense of a politi-
cal  character  or  as an  offense connected  with such an offense").
108.  See  United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty:
Hearings on  Treaty Doc. 88-8  Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th
Cong.,  1st Sess. 2  (1985)  (discussing  exclusion  of particular  crimes from the  political
offense  exception  to  extradition).  See generally Comment,  Revolutionaries Beware:
The Erosion of the Political  Offense Exception Under the 1986 United States-United
Kingdom  Supplementary Extradition Treaty.  136  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  1515  (1988)
(describing the  efforts of some  nations  to combat  modem terrorism).
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of people  and  killed  one  child.1 09  Greek  officials  first  notified  Italian
authorities  that  Greece  would  detain  Zumar  until  he  had  served  his
sentence  for  a  passport  violation.  Instead  of extraditing  him,  as  Italy
had  expected,  under  the  Greek  court's  ruling  that  he was  subject  to
extradition, the Greek Minister of Justice Vassilis  Ratis denied extradi-
tion, stating  that Al  Zumar's action  constituted  legitimate  political  ex-
pression."0  Al  Zumar  fled  to  Algeria.
The difficulties  involved  in extradition  present  a  less  than  encourag-
ing  record  for  its  use  in  cases  of political  violence.  One  study  of the
period  between  1970  and  1975  found  that of  a  total  of 267  terrorists
apprehended,  fifty were  convicted,  but  none had been  extradited to an-
other  state  for  trial."'  Another  study  found  that  of  353  persons  in-
volved in  256 airplane  hijackings  during  the years  1977  to  1982, only
one suspect  was  extradited." 2
The case  of Mohammed  Ali  Hamadei  and  the hijacked  TWA  flight
847  illustrated  the procedures  and  the difficulties  of the  international
extradition  process.  The United States had investigated the hijacking of
TWA  flight  847  long  before  Hamadei's  capture,  and  in  November
1985 had obtained  sealed indictments  against the hijackers.13  Immedi-
ately  after  Hamadei's  arrest  in Germany,  the United  States  sent  a re-
quest  for  provisional  arrest  to  the German  government."  4 Within  the
surprisingly  short period  of a week,  it forwarded  a  massive  extradition
request." 5  Within  a  week  of Hamadei's  arrest,  however,  two  German
nationals  were  taken  hostage  in  Beirut."'  The  kidnappers  demanded
that Germany  not extradite  Hamadei  to the United States  but release
him  in exchange  for the two  Germans.
17
109.  See Gordon,  Thornburg Deplores Greece's Release of Terrorist, U.P.I. News,
Dec.  8,  1988  (reporting  Greece's  release  of Al  Zumar).
110.  See id. Rotis  announced  that Al  Zumar  was  released  because  the  bombing
constituted  an effort to achieve the independence of his homeland and because the PLO
had  renounced the use of terrorism.  Id.  The decision  to release  Al  Zumar was  carried
out  despite  a Greek  Supreme  Court  ruling in  favor of extradition.  Id.
11.  Kittrie,  Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The  Quest for International  Agree-
ment  Over Political Crime and Terrorism, 32 Y.B.  WORLD  AFFAIRS  208,  232 (1978).
112.  See  J.  MURPHY,  PUNISHING  INTERNATIONAL  TERRORISTS:  THE  LEGAL
FRAMEWORK  FOR  POLICY  INITIATIVES  109  (1985)  (providing  an  overview  of the legal
framework  and the  policy towards  terrorism and  analyzing  the disposition  of cases  in-
volving  captured  terrorists).
113.  See  Cimons, Death Penalty Ruled Out in Hijack Case; Move by  U.S.  Helps
Clear Way for Bonn to Extradite Lebanese, L.A. Times, Jan.  19,  1987,  at I  (discuss-
ing  the decision  by  the  U.S.  not  to seek  the  death penalty  for  Hamadei).
114.  Id.
115.  The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, supra note  63,  at 6.
116.  Id.  at  1.
117.  Id. at 6-7.
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Chancellor  Kohl  of  Germany  formed  a  committee  of  top  German
officials  to  decide  how  to  respond. 18  Germany  has  a  federal  govern-
ment  with  most  law  enforcement  responsibilities  lodged  at the  state
level.  Normally, the  Federal  Justice  Ministry  in Germany  would  for-
ward  the  American  extradition  request  to the  German  state  with  re-
sponsibility for the case, in this instance  Hesse."'  A panel of judges in
Hesse, the High Regional  Court, would  decide whether the provisional
arrest  was  warranted  and whether  the extradition  was  in order.1 20  If
the  court responded  affirmatively  to  both questions,  the matter would
return to  Bonn, the federal  capital,  for  a  political decision. 2'
Fearing  that this  routine  procedure  would  lead  to  the  execution  of
the hostages  even if, after the judicial  decision  in Hesse,  Bonn decided
not to extradite,  and thinking  that the normal  sequence might  disrupt
American-German  relations,  Chancellor  Kohl's  working  group  never
sent  the  United  States'  extradition  request  to  Hesse.  The  decisions
whether  to  extradite Hamadei,  to  charge him  in Germany  for the hi-
jacking  under  the  "universal"  jurisdiction  of all  states  in  matters  of
piracy and hijacking, to initially try Hamadei only for the passport and
explosives  charges,  or to release  him was to be made in Bonn.  Consid-
erations  of Atlantic  and  Middle  East  foreign  policy,  concern  for  the
lives of the hostages, a desire to have German investigators discover the
reasons  for  the importation  of the explosives,  and other policy  matters
would  affect Germany's  decision, often  competing with the moral  force
of its treaty with the United States.
The United States pressed  Germany  repeatedly for  extradition, with
arguments  strengthened  by  the  determination  it  showed  in  bombing
Libya only  a  few  months  before  in retaliation  for  a terrorist  attack in
Berlin.122  Daily  revelations  that President  Reagan  had  traded  arms to
Iran for American hostages,  however, weakened  the American position.
As in the Achille Lauro case, the decision whether to try the hijackers
in the courts of a European ally  or of the United States was not suffi-
ciently  important to disturb relations among powerful allies. In a meet-
ing  of the Summit  Seven  in  Venice  in  June  1987,  President  Reagan
told Chancellor Kohl  that he understood  and accepted  Germany's deci-
118.  Id. at 7.
119.  Id. at 8.
120.  Gesetz  uber die internationale  Rechtshilfe  in Strafsachen  (Law  on  Interna-
tional Judicial Assistance  in Criminal Matters),  1982 BGBI.I  2071  (W.  Ger.)  § 12.
121.  Id. § 13.
122.  See Schmemann,  Evolution in Europe:  Bonn.  After Arrests. Checks for Ho-
necker Link to Terrorists, N.Y. Times, June 22,  1990, at A8  (discussing the bombing
of the  Berlin  discotheque  and  the subsequent  air strikes  against Libya  by  American
forces).
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sion  to  try  Hamadei  for  the  hijacking  and  murder  charges  in
Germany.
2 3
C.  HARDER  CASES:  THE  TRIAL  OF  GEORGES  IBRAHIM  ABDALLAH
The  trials  of the  hijackers  of the Achille Lauro in  Italy  and  TWA
flight  847  in Germany  were  satisfactory  solutions.  European  allies  re-
fused  extradition,  but the  trials  went  forward  and  the courts  imposed
severe  sentences. 124 Problems  arise,  however,  when  an ally  is less  will-
ing than were Italy and  Germany to risk  its own hostages  and  its own
foreign  policy  interests.  The requested  state  has  several  courses  of ac-
tion  available to  it. Despite treaties,  technical  flaws in  a request  allow
the  ally  to  ignore the  requirements  of extradition  or  trial,  or  the  ally
can proceed  to trial  in the requested state  with a secret  understanding
with  the terrorist  group that the state  will not seek to impose a severe
sentence. 2 5 Finally, a state may find that the extradition treaty is inap-
plicable  because  a  political  offense  was  involved.
One  solution  in  such  cases  is  to  exert  diplomatic  pressures  on  the
state refusing  extradition. At a minimum, reciprocity  is at stake for the
state  that  is  now  requested  to  furnish  help  may  request  help  in  the
future. States may raise the matter in contexts  where they are working
out other bilateral relations. In an extreme case, requesting states could
warn travellers of the dangers  of travelling  to a country which is hospi-
table to  political violence  against  citizens  of the requesting  state.
The local population  can  also exert domestic  pressure on a requested
state. Large  segments of the public generally  adopt the American  posi-
tion of  treating  terrorism  as  a  criminal  matter  beyond  the bounds  of
diplomatic or humanitarian  calculations, both for moral reasons and for
fear that giving in to terrorists  encourages  further attacks and  abuse of
the state's territory. Generally, diplomatic  courtesy precludes bypassing
an  ally's  high-ranking  officials  and  speaking  directly  to  its  public  in
criticism  of  official  action.  This  remains,  however,  an  option  for  re-
questing  states.
In the Achille Lauro case  the coalition  government of Prime  Minis-
ter  Craxi dissolved  when  it disagreed  over  Craxi's  handling  of the  hi-
123.  The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, supra note  63,  at  18.
124.  See id. at  20  (reporting  that  Hamadei  received  a  sentence  of  life  imprison-
ment  for  hijacking  and  murder);  The  Achille Lauro Hijacking, supra note  1, at  18
(reporting  the sentences  handed  down  by the Genoa  Assize  Court for  the perpetrators
of the Achille Lauro hijacking).
125.  See  infra notes  148-167  (discussing  the  possibility  of  Abdallah  receiving  a
short  sentence,  because  of the  fear  of  reprisals  against  French  citizens,  and  United
States actions  to ensure  that Abdallah  received  the  maximum  sentence).
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jackers. The  United States'  objections  to Craxi's actions may have  in-
stigated the disagreement  among Italian  officials.  Indeed,  immediately
after the Italian government allowed  Abu Abbas  to leave Italy, a state-
ment issued  by the White  House described Abbas  as "one  of the most
notorious  Palestinian  terrorists  [who]  has  been  involved  in savage  at-
tacks  on  civilians,'1 2 6  and  stated  that  the  American  government  was
"astonished  at  this  breach  of  any  reasonable  standard  of  due  pro-
cess."127 The statement  added  that the United States  "finds  it incom-
prehensible that Italian authorities permitted  Abu Abbas to leave Italy.
"5128
Trying terrorists  in domestic courts  is one way that a treaty  partner
may avoid diplomatic and domestic pressures. The democratic  tradition
in western  nations  require  that the judicial  branch of government  re-
main immune to international  and domestic  political pressure. If, how-
ever,  the  political  authorities  of  a  reluctant  requested  state  use  their
control  of  prosecutors  and  perhaps  also  wield  some  private  influence
over the courts, the state may avoid  extradition  by promising  trial and,
at the same time, reassure suspects  that they will not receive  a severe
sentence. In this way it can protect hostages  or foreign policy interests
without alienating  a  powerful ally that was  the victim of terrorism.  In
fact,  even  if the  requested  state  is  sincere  in its  efforts  to  prosecute,
most terrorism cases do not result in convictions.  According to German
Justice Ministry official Peter Wilkitzld, between  1980 and  1985,  Ger-
many  refused  extradition  in  sixty-nine  cases,  instead  attempting  to
prosecute  in  its domestic  courts.12 9  Not  one of these  prosecutions  was
successful,  generally  because Germany  was  unable to gather  adequate
evidence. 30
France  chose  this  solution  in  the  1986  case  of  Georges  Ibrahim
Abdailah.  Abdallah  led  a  small  terrorist  group  called  the  Lebanese
Armed  Revolutionary  Factions  (FARL)  .131  The  group  primarily
targeted  diplomatic  officials.'32  In  1981,  a  gunman  shot and  wounded
First  Counsellor  Christian  Chapman,  of  the  American  Embassy  in
126.  White  House Press  Release,  Oct.  13,  1985,  reprinted in The  Achille Lauro
Hijacking, supra note  1, at 20(B).
127.  Id.
128.  Id.
129.  The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, supra note 63,  at  14.
130.  Id.
131.  Jenkins,  Terrorism in  the  Cour d'Assises:  The US.  v.  France v.  Georges
Ibrahim Abdallah, at  1, (1989)  [hereinafter  U.S.  v.  France v. Abdallah]  (available
from the Case Program, John  F. Kennedy School of Government,  Harvard  University,
Kennedy  School  Case No. C16-89-904.0).
132.  Id. at 2.
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Paris.133  On January  18,  1982,  the Deputy  Military  Attache,  Lt.  Col.
Charles  Ray was killed, and  FARL publicly assumed responsibility  for
the  murder.' 3 4 Three  months  later, a terrorist  used  the same  7.65 cali-
ber  revolver  to  kill  the Second  Secretary,  Yacov  Barsimantov,  of the
Israeli  Embassy  in  Paris. 3 5  In  late  1982,  FARL  targeted  the  United
States'  commercial  attache  and the Israeli Embassy. 3"  Further during
1984,  FARL  claimed  responsibility  for the  assassination  in  Rome  of
the American  General  Leamon  Hunt,  chief of the international  obser-
vation  force  in  the  Sinai,  and  for  the  wounding  of  Robert  Homme,
American  representative  to the European  Parliament  in  Strasbourg. 37
Abdallah  was  also  suspected  in  the  1976  assassination  of  Francis
Meloy,  the American  Ambassador  in Beirut.1 38
French  counter-terrorist  officials  obtained  much  of the  information
that  France  needed  about  FARL  from  the  Israeli  secret  service,  the
Mossad.1 3 1 The Mossad had been following  the FARL and its members
closely.  Italian sources  provided a  lead to the French counter-terrorism
organization,  the  Directorate  for  Surveillance  of  the  Territory
(DST) .140  This  information  led,  through careful  surveillance  of several
FARL  agents,  to the  arrest of Abdallah  in the  fall  of 1984.141  France
formally  charged  Abdallah  only  with  possession  of forged  documents
and association with  malefactors  in Lyon. 42 The  DST, however, aided
by the counter-terrorism  organizations  of the United  States and  Israel,
began  an  investigation  that  produced  far  more  serious  incriminating
information.
The  French  government  was  under  substantial  pressure  to  release
Abdallah,  despite  FARL's reign  of terror on  American and  Israeli  dip-
lomats.  Several  months  after  Abdallah's  arrest,  Gilles  Sydney  Peyrol-
les,  the director  of the  French  cultural  center  in  Tripoli,  Libya,  was
kidnapped.' 4 3  The  French  government  learned  that  the  kidnappers
133.  Id. at  1.
134.  Id.
135.  Id. at 2.
136.  Id.
137.  Id. at  3.
138.  Id. at 2.
139.  See id. (discussing  the information  provided  to the DST  by the Mossad  on the
origins of FARL, its leader, Abdallah,  and Abdallah's  prior  involvement with terrorist
groups  in  the  Middle  East and  Europe).
140.  Id. at 3.
141.  See id. at  3-4  (discussing  the details  of the DST's  pursuit  of Abdallah).
142.  Id. at 4.
143.  Id. Peyrolles  was  also the  son of  Gilles  Perrault,  a  close  friend  of  President
Mitterrand.  Id.
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would  release  Peyrolles  only  in  exchange  for  Abdallah.'"  An  activist
from President Mitterrand's Socialist party who had close ties with Al-
geria's  ruling  party  arranged  for  an  Algerian  lieutenant  to visit  with
Abdallah  in Paris.14 5 Abdallah gave the Algerian the names of the peo-
ple  to  whom he  should  speak.  14  The Algerian  then  met  with  FARL
representatives  in  Beirut. 4'
The French  foreign  minister  knew that  it was impossible  to remove
Abdallah from the judicial process,  but he was also aware  that the jus-
tice minister had obligingly indicated that, given the state of the crimi-
nal charges  against  him,  "Abdallah  doesn't  risk  any more  than  eight
months  in prison."' 1 48 The  foreign  minister conveyed  to the kidnappers
that  "it is  possible to  foresee  that Abdallah  will  only  be subjected  to
proceedings  in  a  correctional  court.""4 9  On  this  basis  the FARL kid-
nappers  released  Peyrolles.
Almost  immediately  thereafter,  investigators  discovered  new evi-
dence  linking  Abdallah  directly  and  personally  to  the  shootings  of
Chapman,  Ray,  and  Barsimantov. 50  The  investigating  judge,  who
functions  in  France  as  a  prosecutor  might  in  the  United  States,  re-
ceived  this  evidence.  As  a  result,  he opened  new proceedings  for  the
shootings  and  homicides. 1  An  early  release  for  Abdallah  looked  in-
creasingly unlikely.  Abdallah wrote  a public letter  to the justice minis-
ter complaining  that, at the time of Peyrolles'  kidnapping,  "the  French
government...  informed me that I would be judged within a month for
the use of false  documents  and expelled  to the country  of my choice if
the Arab militants  who had Mr. Peyrolles  freed him.  But I am still in
prison."
152
FARL representatives  in Beirut threatened  retaliation through bomb
attacks  unless  France  promptly released  Abdallah  and  two other  ter-
rorists.153 For several  months,  bombs  exploded  throughout  Paris, caus-
144.  Id. at  5. The  French  government  was  assisted  in its search  for  Peyrolles  by
Msgr. Hilarion Capucci,  former  Greek Catholic Archbishop  in Jerusalem. Id. Capucci
had also been involved in the negotiations  for the release of the U.S. hostages in Iran in





148.  Id. at 6.
149.  Id.
150.  Id. The DST raided  Abdallah's  apartment  in  Paris  and  found  the  gun  that
was  used  to shoot  the three  men. Id.
151.  Id.
152.  Id. at 7.
153.  Id. at 8.
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ing  numerous  deaths,  injuries,  and  near-panic. 154  A  final  pressure  on
the French  came  from  France's  Algerian  intermediaries,  who  felt  be-
trayed. The  Algerians  had relayed  to  FARL and  Abdallah  the  French
forecast  of a  maximum  prison  sentence  of eight  months.  Now  FARL
threatened Algerian  diplomats. The Algerians  pleaded  with the French
to release  Abdallah.
In  these  circumstances,  the  United  States  feared  that  the  French
would  use a trial of Abdallah to bring  about his prompt  release rather
than  his  prolonged  detention.  French  authorities  might  send  a  subtle
message  to  the  investigating  judge  not  to  develop  all  of the  relevant
information.  Alternatively,  the prosecutor  might urge  the weakness  of
the case or the desirability  of a  light sentence.  In one way  or another,
the government's  strong  wishes to dispose of the matter leniently  might
influence  the  prosecutors,  the  investigating  magistrate,  and  the  trial
judges.
The United States  also had cards  to play.  Courts in western democ-
racies  are  proud  of  their  independence.  The  rules  of  procedure  in
France,  as in most countries  using the Napoleonic Code,  allow one  who
has  received  a "personal  and direct  injury"  from a criminal  act to join
a  civil  case  with  the  criminal  proceedings. 5  As  a  participant  in  the
merged civil-criminal  proceedings,  the civil party can ask the investiga-
tive  magistrate  to pursue  additional  investigations,  summon  witnesses
and question them  during the criminal trial, deliver opening  and closing
statements,  and  recommend  prison  sentences.
Both  the United  States,  as  the  employer  of the attacked  diplomats,
and the  widow  of Lt. Col. Charles  R. Ray joined their  civil  suit  to the
criminal  proceedings  against  Abdallah.156  A  distinguished  Parisian  at-
torney,  Georges Kiejman,  represented  both the United States and  Mrs.
Ray. It seemed  essential to intervene in the proceedings  to assure vigor-
ous  prosecution.  For  in  a  preliminary  trial  for  possession  of weapons
and explosives,  use of forged documents,  and  association  with malefac-
tors,  the judge  had emphasized  the historic friendship  between  France
and  Lebanon  and  the  prosecutor  had urged  an unexpectedly  low  sen-
tence, commenting that Abdallah  had "never  demonstrated  any resent-
ment towards  France."' 57
Waiting  to  see  if  France  would  bring  the  more  serious  charges
against Abdallah,  the United States publicly complained  to the  French
154.  Id.
155.  C.  PEN.  art.  86  (discussed  in id. at  10).
156.  Id.  at  14.
157.  Id. at  13.
[VOL.  6:1INTERNATIONAL  COOPERATION
press  about  the prosecutor's  behavior  in the  earlier trial. The foreign
minister objected that such comments ignored  the independence  of the
judiciary  in  France.  High-ranking  American  officials  communicated
their demand  for  a  serious  trial to  their  French  counterparts.  France
responded  that the courts  and justice  ministry would  decide the case.
The United States  hinted that American  tourists would  avoid traveling
to  France  in  the  future.  The  pressures  on  the  French  from  the  ter-
rorists,  however,  remained as  strong  as  they had  always  been.
The French security minister met with the judge in charge of investi-
gating  the  more  serious  charges  against  Abdallah  and  urged  him  to
delay his decision.  Following the meeting,  the judge told the press that
the evidence  against Abdallah seemed very weak. An official in the jus-
tice ministry  issued  orders  to  the  public  prosecutor's  office to  dismiss
the charges  against Abdallah. When the prosecutor  did not dismiss the
charges,  Abdallah's  supporters  launched  a  new  wave  of bombings  in
September  1986.158 Statements of the new  French prime minister, Jac-
ques Chirac, and  of the interior  minister suggested  that France might
be prepared  to  make  a  deal  involving  the release  of Abdallah  in  ex-
change  for an  end  to the terror  on  the streets  of Paris. 1 ,
In this context of likely secret understandings  between France, Alge-
ria, FARL, and  even  Syria, an  old ally of France  in the Middle East,
and amidst rumors in the press that the upcoming trial of Abdallah on
the more serious  charges  would  produce  a verdict favorable  to Abdal-
lah, the United  States  decided  to take  advantage  of the reputation of
the  courts  for  independence  and  allegiance  to  a  set  of  non-political
rules  and  procedures.  Kiejman,  the  French  lawyer  representing  the
United  States  and  Mrs.  Ray,  pressed  the  investigative  magistrate  to
introduce powerful incriminating evidence that the magistrate had pre-
viously left out. The magistrate agreed  to include the incriminating  evi-
dence. At trial, Kiejman effectively  protested the alleged  unavailability
of a crucial  witness, the French diplomat Peyrolles.10  The FARL kid-
nappers had  told Peyrolles  that they were responsible for the shootings
of  Ray,  Chapman,  and  Barsimantov.  Keijman  repeatedly  suggested
that the investigation  and prosecution  had been  far from vigorous,  and
marked  by  repeated  interference  by  the  French  government."' 1  The
French  press  became  suspicious  of improper meddling  in criminal  in-
vestigations  for  political reasons.
158.  Id. at 16.
159.  Id. at  18.
160.  Id. at 23.
161.  Id. at 25.
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At the close of the trial  after four  days  of testimony,  the prosecutor
spoke of the risk to the hostages and explained that, "paying a personal
price,  [I come]  to ask of you, to implore  you, grieving to death:  Do not
pronounce  against Ibrahim  Abdallah  a  criminal  sentence  of more  than
ten years."' 6 2 Keijman argued  that the judges should put the danger  of
reprisals  out of their mind, asserting that it was the judge's responsibil-
ity to sentence  Abdallah.1 6 3 The  government  could  pardon  him in  part
or in  whole if that was its political judgment: 64  "It is not for you  to do
the state's work the first time a major terrorist appears before a French
court.... Your only mission is  to deliver justice not services.  The only
state  for  you  should  be the  state  of law."'0 5 The  press  described  the
closing arguments  as the story of a government that "succumbed  to the
threat of terrorist  attacks and  a judicial  system that succumbed  to po-
litical  influence."'16 6
After  only  seventy  minutes  of  deliberations,  the judges  sentenced
Abdallah  to  the  maximum  sentence  of  life  imprisonment.  The
French  press  broadly  applauded  the courage  and  independence  of the
court.'68 The United States and other western states learned  a new  les-
son.  Although  every  extradition  treaty  gives  the  requested  state  the
right  to  try the suspect  rather  than to  extradite  him-thus creating  a
fertile  opportunity  for  making  secret  deals-victim  states  can  effec-
tively  use the independence  of the courts  in  any  system  where  private
parties  have  a  right to  participate  in the criminal  trial.
CONCLUSION:  A  FINAL ASSESSMENT
The United States has been blessed  with a remarkably  small amount
of  terrorism  within  its  borders,  yet  American  citizens  are  leading
targets  of terrorist operations  in Western  Europe and  the Middle  East.
Because terrorist attacks on Americans  frequently occur abroad, it  is in
the interests of the United States to further  international cooperation  in
preventing  attacks  and  in  arresting  and  convicting  those  responsible.
We are  on the  right course in pressing  the importance  of international
cooperation  in discussions  with  our allies.  The  alternative  of unilateral
action  is often  brutal,  particularly if it involves  assassination  by secret
162.  Id.  at 26-27.
163.  Id.  at 27.
164.  Id.
165.  Id.
166.  Id. at 28.
167.  Id.
168.  Id.  (quoting reports  from  the French  newspapers  Le Figaro,  Libration,  and
Parisien  Lib&r).
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intelligence  operations or open  military  retaliation against a state  that
supports  terrorists.  More  measured  unilateral  action  aimed  at  arrest
and  trial can  rarely  be  executed  without  invading  the sovereignty  of
other  nations.
Politics  are at least  as  important  as law,  and both  are more  impor-
tant  than public  declarations  in determining  whether  even  our  closest
allies will cooperate in particular  ways. The United States itself has not
been steadfast in its handling of terrorism. Foreign policy concerns and
bureaucratic  suspicions  continue  to  limit the exchange  of information
on terrorists  among  national intelligence  agencies,  even  though  recent
cases  provide dramatic  examples of the success  of intelligence sharing.
Extradition  treaties with the option of extradition  or trial in the coun-
try  where  a  suspect  is  found  have  poor  statistical  records  of success,
reflecting  the ability of foreign and domestic politics to overcome treaty
obligations.  Nevertheless,  the convictions  and  lengthy sentences  of the
Achille Lauro and  TWA  flight  847  hijackers  may  foreshadow  better
cooperation  in the future.
Treaty obligations  and rules of customary international  law facilitate
cooperation  without requiring it, allowing  nations to maneuver  in their
dealings with  political violence.  Ultimately,  the extent of international
cooperation  with respect  to terrorists  depends  upon the United  States'
success  in arguing  that the treatment  of terrorism should  be  a matter
of international  morality  and firm  rules reflecting  a message  of unwa-
vering  determination,  not  a matter  of accommodation  to  threats,  for-
eign policy  concerns,  ideological  sympathies,  or domestic  politics. This
has  not  yet  been  the  view  of  many  of our  closest  allies,  but  it  may
become  so in  the future.
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